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Hand-Waving as a New Standard of
Review: When Analyzing Matching Rights,
has the Delaware Court of Chancery
Abdicated its Review Process?
Andrew D. Kinsey*
ABSTRACT
Deal protections have become increasingly popular in corporate
merger agreements over the past decade, and they have also become
increasingly more varied. One of the more popular deal protection
measures is a matching right that enables an accepted bidder to match
any subsequent bid that comes in. It is virtually ubiquitous in modem
deals. Such ubiquity has led to potential problems. When Delaware
courts review challenges to deal protection measures they are supposed
to use an intermediate standard of review. Instead, however, the
Delaware Court of Chancery appears to be subjecting matching rights to
nothing more than a cursory glance, which stands in stark contrast to
how the court treats other deal protection measures.
This Comment discusses that appearance of permissiveness. In
addition, this Comment discusses the proper standard of review for deal
protection measures and analyzes how courts ought to review deal
protection measures. Finally, this Comment suggests a reason for the
alleged permissiveness and discusses a solution that will enable
Delaware courts to properly review challenges to matching rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, corporate merger agreements have become
replete with deal protections in what scholars have called "lock-up
creep."' Some defensive measures have become so prevalent that
Delaware courts have "started to refer to [them] as 'standard merger
terms."'2 Not only have deal protection measures become increasingly
popular, but they have also become more creative and varied.3 One of
the more popular new deal protection measures is a matching right that
allows the holder of the right to maintain its deal by matching a third
party's higher bid.4
When deal protection measures are challenged, Delaware courts are
supposed to analyze them to ensure the corporate board that used the
measures did not breach any of their duties.s The analyzing court is
required to use a non-deferential standard of review in its analysis of the
deal protection measures.6 However, at least one scholar has suggested
that the Delaware Court of Chancery "ha[s] adopted a ... permissive
posture with respect to matching rights."7 In other words, the court has
1. Steven Davidoff & Christina Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 681
(2013) (describing lock-up creep as the phenomenon where the "number and type of
merger agreement lock-ups have materially increased").
2. J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why It's True and What it
Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FiN. L. 5, 35 (2013) (footnote omitted).
3. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 1, at 682.
4. See id.; see infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for a description of
matching rights.
5. See discussion infra Part II.B.
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. Brian JM Quinn, Re-evaluating the Emerging Standard of Review for Matching
Rights in Control Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1013 (2011) [hereinafter
Quinn, Re-evaluating the Standard].
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allegedly not used the proper standard of review when dealing with
challenges to matching rights.
This Comment addresses the perceived permissive posture by the
Chancery Court and provides a potential solution. Part II will offer a
background of deal protections,8 the current scholarship surrounding
their use,9 and the standard of review that Delaware courts have
developed to analyze challenges to deal protection measures.0 Part III
will analyze Delaware Court of Chancery opinions issued since Professor
Quinn's 2011 article," which incorrectly analyzed the permissiveness
issue, and discuss potential reasons behind the alleged permissiveness.12
Part III will then suggest that the Court of Chancery is not being overly
permissive, but rather lacks a sufficient framework to analyze matching
rights properly and, absent such a framework, can only look to
precedent.13  To solve that problem, this Comment will propose that
empiricists should perform a detailed economic analysis of matching
rights to assist the court in future determinations.'14
II. BACKGROUND
A. Deal Protection Measures.
Matching rights are a type of deal protection measure,5 so to
understand matching rights it is useful to first understand deal protection
measures generally. Deal protection measures'6 can be placed into one
of three categories: "voting protections, exclusivity measures, and
compensatory devices."'7  Deal protection measures function either as
wards against hird party interference in friendly deals or as defensive
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.
11. See Quinn, Re-evaluating the Standard, supra note 7.
12. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
13. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
14. See discussion infra Part III.B.
15. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
16. "Lock-ups," "deal protections," "defensive devices," and "deal protection
measures" are all terms that are used interchangeably. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v.
Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (lock-ups);
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 934 (Del. 2003) ("Defensive
devices . . . is a synonym for what are frequently referred to as 'deal protection devices.'
Both terms are used interchangeably to describe any measure ... intended to protect the
[deal]"); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate
Control, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1539, 1541-42 (1996) (lock-up); Brian JM Quinn,
Bulletproof Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865, 866 n.2 (2007)
(describing different terms) [hereinafter Quinn, Bulletproof]. However "stock lockup" is
a specific type of deal protection measure. See infra note 27.
17. Quinn, Bulletproof supra note 16, at 868.
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measures by inducing white knight18 bidders in attempts to defeat or
prevent hostile tender offers.1 9
Voting protections deal with voting agreements that are acquired by
the seller's board of directors ("board") to protect the board's preferred
deal.2 0 While it is easier for the board of a closely held corporation2 1 to
secure such voting agreements because of the limited number of
shareholders, a public corporation may have a small number of
shareholders that hold a large enough percentage of shares to make such
protections attractive even in deals involving public corporations.22 A
common voting protection measure is a "'force-the-vote' provision that
requires boards to call [a vote on the initial transaction] prior to
terminating a merger agreement[.]"23 This vote can occur regardless of
whether the board recommends the transaction or not.24
Compensatory devices are measures that provide some measure of
compensation to the initial successful bidder while simultaneously
deterring other bidders.25 Common compensatory devices include
"[s]tock lockups, termination fees, and topping fees[.]" 2 6 A stock lockup
is an agreement that allows a bidder to purchase the target company's
18. Melissa J. Rhodes, The White Knight Privilege in Litigated Takeovers: Leveling
the Playing Field in Discovery, 43 STAN. L. REv. 445, 445 n.1 (1991) (defining a "white
knight" as "a bidder seen as friendlier by the management of the target company than the
unsolicited outside bidder").
19. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 16, at 1541-42. A tender offer is an attempt
to gain a controlling interest in a corporation through an offer to purchase shares of the
corporation. See Jo Hackl and Rosa Testani, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes
and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193, 1193 n.1 (1988). A
hostile tender offer is one in which a corporation is attempting to takeover another
corporation without approval from the target corporation's board of directors. See 1-5E
ELEANOR Fox & BYRON Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 5E.01
(Matthew Bender 2016).
20. See Quinn, Bulletproof supra note 16, at 868.
21. A closely held corporation has a limited number of shareholders, no market for
its shares, and significant day-to-day control exercised by majority shareholders. See
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975). For a background
on Delaware-specific aspects of closely held corporations, see generally Robert Ragazzo,
Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L. Q.
1099 (1999).
22. See Quinn, Bulletproof supra note 16, at 868-69. See generally Omnicare, Inc.
v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) (dealing with a corporation where two
shareholders controlled a majority of the voting shares).
23. Quinn, Bulletproof supra note 16, at 869.
24. See id at 869 n.11; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2017) (allowing a
vote without board recommendation). This can theoretically allow the spurned buyer to
close the deal anyway if it can convince enough shareholders to vote for the deal. See R.
Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Deal-Protection Measures and the Merger
Recommendation, 96 NW. U.L. REv. 467, 473 (2002).
25. See Quinn, Bulletproof supra note 16, at 871.
26. Id
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stock after a specified event occurs, like the termination of the deal.27
This is beneficial to the initial bidder because it increases the number of
shares that a subsequent bidder will need to purchase by increasing the
number of shares on the market,28 while providing a premium to the
initial bidder because the price paid is the original bid price.29 By way of
illustration, suppose company T had 100 outstanding shares and bidder A
gave a bid of $10. The total deal value would be $1,000. If bidder A had
a stock lockup that enabled it to purchase up to 10 shares and bidder B
made a subsequent bid of $11 that was accepted, then bidder A would
purchase 10 shares for $10. There would now be 110 shares outstanding,
so the deal value would be $1,210 ($11 * 110 shares). Without the stock
lockup, the deal value would be $1,100 ($11 * 100 shares); so the stock
lockup costs bidder B an additional $110 while bidder A would be paid
$11 per share when the deal closed (a premium of $1 per share) for a
profit of $10 to compensate it for the lost deal. Termination fees and
topping fees are cash payments made to the initial bidder based upon
certain triggering events: a termination fee when the deal is terminated
and a topping fee when the seller accepts a higher competing bid (i.e.,
accepts a topping bid). 3 0 Economically, from the perspective of later
bidders, a compensatory device can be seen "as a tax on its bid."31
An exclusivity measure is one designed to inhibit the board of the
selling corporation from dealing with rival bidders.32 The most common
exclusivity measures are "no-shop and no-talk provisions"[.] 3 3 A no-
shop provision, also known as a "no-solicitation" measure or a "window
shop" provision, prevents the seller's board from attempting to find
another buyer but does not prevent the board from responding to
unsolicited bids.34  A no-talk provision limits the responses that the
selling board can make to subsequent bidders, so that the board cannot
share any information that is non-public.3 5 The combination of a no-talk
27. See id. For an example of a deal with a stock lockup option, see Paramount
Commc'ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994).
28. The shares that the holder of the lockup purchases are either "treasury shares []
or authorized but unissued shares." Timothy Burch, Locking out rival bidders: The use of
lockup options in corporate mergers, 60 J. FIN. EcoN. 103, 108 (2001).
29. See id. Since a stock lockup only kicks in when a higher subsequent bid is
accepted, it necessarily means that the price the initial bidder pays for the agreed upon
shares is lower than the final sale price. See id for more details on stock lockups.
30. See Quinn, Bulletproof supra note 16, at 871.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 869.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 869-70.
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and no-shop provision effectively "starv[es] a subsequent bidder of the
information required to generate a competitive bid."3 6
Another exclusivity measure used to limit subsequent bids, which is
the focus of this Comment, is a matching right. A matching right
grants the holder the right to match any new bid that comes in, which
could cause a subsequent bidder to incur the cost of the bid 38 without the
benefit of its superior bid being accepted.39 Matching rights are
"intended to [] deter second bidders" or to make sure that "the initial
bidder [is] advantageously positioned to succeed in completing the
acquisition."40 The importance and perceived utility of matching rights
is underscored by the fact that they are "ubiquitous terms in merger
agreements."4 1
Theoretically, deal protections work because it costs money to make
a bid,42 and deal protection measures increase those costs only for
subsequent bidders without foreclosing substantially better bids.43 The
increased cost caused by deal protection measures can impact the amount
that a subsequent bidder is willing to pay for the target corporation.44
While deal protections are useful, there is a potential pitfall. If the
boards of selling organizations are tasked with finding the highest bidder,
then a deal protection that deters multiple bidders is problematic.45 It is
therefore of critical importance that the courts properly review deal
protections to promote wealth.maximization.
B. Proper Standard of Review
1. From Unocal to Revlon
As a general rule, Delaware courts give broad deference to actions
taken by corporate boards through the business judgment rule.46 It is
36. Id. at 870.
37. See id.
38. For a discussion of bid costs, see infra note 42.
39. See infra note 42.
40. Quinn, Re-evaluating the Standard, supra note 7, at 1012.
41. Id. at 1015.
42. See Kahan & Klausnar, supra note 16, at 1547. Costs are significant enough that
failing bids can lead to significant stock declines for the failing bidder. Id at 1547 n.25.
43. See id. at 1544.
44. See Quinn, Bulletproof supra note 16, at 867. Because of the cost of making a
bid, the bidder will only bid if after-acquisition profit is enough to justify the cost of the
bid. For a more detailed economic analysis of how deal protection measures can impact
acquisitions, see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 16, at 1547-48.
45. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
46. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (2000) (defining the business judgment rule
as "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
912 [Vol. 121:3
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important to note that the business judgment rule does not mean that
judicial deference to corporate board action is absolute.47 When a board
adopts deal protection measures, the measures "must be reasonable in
relation to the threat posed" in order to qualify for judicial deference
under the business judgment rule4 8  The Supreme Court of Delaware
adopted a reasonableness rule in Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.49 when dealing with a novel deal protection measure involving a
board's attempt to block a hostile tender offer.50 The court noted that he
board had presumptive power to act because of the "fundamental duty
and obligation" of a corporate board "to protect the corporate enterprise,
which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived."5 1
The Unocal decision formed the foundation for subsequent reviews
of defensive measures used by corporate boards. At first glance it
would not appear that Unocal, which focused upon defensive measures,
is relevant to a discussion of matching rights (or deal protections in
general). However, deal protections can also be used as defensive
measures.53
Following Unocal, the court in Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.5 4 dealt with the defensive use of deal protections.
The underlying dispute in Revlon was simple: the board of Revlon
defensively used various measures to deal with a hostile takeover threat
by Pantry Pride.5 In Revlon, the court made it explicit that the Revlon
board's defensive use of deal protections to induce a "white knight"
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company").
47. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(allowing for a judicial review of board actions taken during takeover negotiations
"[biecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders" before the business
judgment rule protections cover the board).
48. Id. at 955.
49. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
50. In Unocal, the board attempted to block a hostile tender offer by Mesa by
making a self-tender of its own shares, but excluding Mesa from the self-tender offer.
See id. at 951.
51. Id. at 954.
52. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.), 651 A.2d 1361, 1373
(Del. 1995) ("The common law pronouncement in Unocal of enhanced judicial scrutiny,
as a threshold or condition precedent to an application of the traditional business
judgment rule, is now well known.").
53. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
177 (Del. 1986) (dealing with a company using deal protections to induce a third party to
bid in order to overcome a hostile takeover bid). For a general background on the
defensive use of deal protections, see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 16, at 1551-64.
54. Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
55. See id. at 176-79.
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bidder was "a recognition that the company was for sale."56 Once a
company is for sale, the board's sole focus and goal should be to "sell
[the corporation] to the highest bidder"" which at that point was Pantry
Pride.
The Revlon directors initially used two different defensive measures
to protect against the hostile offer by Pantry Pride: a poison-pill rights
plan" and a self-tender offer similar to that employed in Unocal.5 9 With
respect to both defensive measures, the court used "the fiduciary
standards outlined in Unocal" to analyze the board's actions and found
that "the [Revlon] board acted in good faith, and on an informed basis."6 o
After Pantry Pride increased its offer, the board gave authorization to the
management o try to negotiate a deal with a third party (i.e. to find a
"white knight" bidder).6 1 The court asserted that it was at this point that
the board had put the company up for sale because the board's focus had
shifted from blocking the takeover to selling to a preferred party.62 As a
result, the board's duty shifted to one of bid maximization.63
Bid maximization does not entirely preclude attempts to induce
third party bidders, as the court acknowledged the economic reality that
some "white knight" bidders may only be induced to bid by "some form
of compensation to cover the risks and costs involved."64  In fact,
Revlon's board was successful in inducing a third party bid through the
offering of several deal protections including a no-shop provision and the
right to purchase certain assets at $100-175 million below market value
if another bidder acquired more than 40 percent of Revlon's shares.
The court held that while deal protection measures are not per se illegal
in Delaware, they are not allowed when motivated by something other
than bid maximization and result in "the ultimate detriment of [a
corporation's] shareholders."66
56. Id. at 182.
57. Id.; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288
(Del. 1989) ("We stated in Revlon, and again here, that in a sale of corporate control the
responsibility of the directors is to get the highest value reasonably attainable for the
shareholders.").
58. A poison pill, or shareholder rights plan, "dilute[s] a hostile bidder's stake
massively if the bidder acquires more than a specific percentage of target stock." Albert
Saulsbury, The Availability of Takeover Defenses and Deal Protection Devices for Anglo-
American Target Companies, 37 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 115, 137 n.152 (2012).
59. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81.
60. Id. at 181.
61. See id. at 182.
62. See id.
63. See id
64. Id. at 183.
65. See id. at 178.
66. Id. at 185.
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The underlying concern behind both the Unocal and Revlon
decisions is that a corporate board might have different motivations and
interests than that of the stockholders.67 The Delaware courts made a
conscious decision to "adopt[] a middle ground"68 between the business
judgment rule69 (representing extreme deference to the board's actions)
and entire fairness review 70 (representing extreme skepticism of the
board's actions). The middle ground is the enhanced scrutiny test where
"the extent of judicial deference ... narrows from rationality to range-of-
reasonableness."
2. Evolution of the Enhanced Scrutiny Test and the Application
in Non-matching Rights Contexts
The Supreme Court of Delaware had a chance to apply the Unocal-
Revlon enhanced scrutiny72 standard in Paramount Communications v.
Q VC Network.73 In doing so, the Court created a two-step test for future
courts:
(a) a judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the
decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including the
information on which the directors based their decision; and (b) a
judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors' action in
light of the circumstances then existing. The directors have the
burden of proving that they were adequately informed and acted
reasonably.i4
The court has to decide whether the directors' actions were
reasonable, as opposed to perfect, and courts are not to "substitute their
business judgment for that of the directors," but rather to discern whether
the board's "decision was, on balance, within a range of
67. See In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010).
68. Id.; see also id. at 598 n.175 (providing more background on the adoption of a
middle ground test).
69. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
70. See In re Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 ("[E]ntire fairness review reflect[s] a
policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing decisions"); see also Weinberger v.
UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing entire fairness review and its
application).
71. Laster, supra note 2, at 6.
72. While the Delaware courts refer to this as enhanced scrutiny, some scholars refer
to this as an intermediate standard of review. See, e.g., Quinn, Re-evaluating the
Standard, supra note 7, at 1012.
73. Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994) ("[W]e
hold that the sale of control in this case . . . implicates enhanced judicial scrutiny of the
conduct of the Paramount Board under Unocal. . and Revlon").
74. Id. at 45.
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reasonableness."75 This suggests that residual vestiges of the business
judgment rule are lurking in the enhanced scrutiny test, which raises the
question of whether Paramount, despite the actual claim of enhanced
scrutiny, actually stands for the idea that the business judgment rule
protects boards who lock up a friendly deal against subsequent bidders.76
In other words, the actual standard applied might be less strict than the
enhanced scrutiny test would require.
The Paramount court, in determining whether the Paramount board
breached its Revlon duties,77 based its analysis upon the framework laid
out in an earlier case: Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corporation.7 8
The court in Unitrin noted that the enhanced scrutiny test should not
"lead to a structured, mechanistic, mathematical exercise."79  To
emphasize that point, the Unitrin court pointed out the fallacy behind
attempts to turn the "inherently qualitative proportionality test" into "a
quantitative formula."80 Instead, the test "is a flexible paradigm"8' that
can be applied, to the wide range of situations that a corporate board
faces.
In applying the flexible paradigm, the Paramount court laid out the
requirements for the board:82 the Paramount board needed to critically
evaluate "all material aspects of the . . . transaction (separately and in the
aggregate)" to determine if they "were reasonable and in the best
interests of the Paramount stockholders[.]"8 3  Further, the board was
obliged to determine whether the deal provisions both individually and
together among other things "adversely affected the value provided to the
Paramount stockholders"[,] 84 or either prevented or encouraged other
bids. The court then determined that the deal protections, including a
75. Id.
76. See Quinn; Bulletproof supra note 16, at 873 n.28. However, the fact that the
Delaware Supreme Court ruled against the Paramount board suggests that this might be a
faulty reading. See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51 (describing the board's process as
"deficient")
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. But see Laster, supra note 2 at 6-7
for a discussion on why "Revlon duties" may not be an accurate phrase and Revlon is
better understood to be a standard of review only.
78. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.), 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
79. Id. at 1373.
80. Id. at 1373 n.13 (laying out a sample mathematical formula with many different
terms and then noting that only one of the terms is "precisely known[,]" whereas the
other terms "may only be approximated").
81. Id. at 1373.
82. This guidance is useful for future boards to the extent that they look to the courts
for dealing with potential deals. See Saulsbury, supra note 58, at 120; see also infra note
106 and accompanying text.
83. Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34,48 (Del. 1994).
84. Id.
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stock option agreement, termination fees, and no-shop provisions, were
unreasonable and a breach of the board's Revlon duties.ss
Almost a decade later the Delaware Supreme Court had the
opportunity to explore a situation where the deal protections were severe
enough to constitute a bulletproof deal. In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc.,8 the court dealt with a merger agreement between
NCS, the seller, and Genesis, the buyer, which had two agreements: a
"call the vote" agreement and a voting agreement. The voting
agreement required that the two largest NCS shareholders, who
controlled a majority of the voting shares, agree to vote in favor of the
merger.89 The Omnicare court reiterated the fact that deal protection
measures are reviewed under enhanced scrutiny.90 The court further
explained the range of reasonableness from Paramount, noting that a
board needs "latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders when defending against perceived
threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint."91 The
court noted that the reason Genesis insisted upon the deal protections
was that "it feared that Onmicare would make a superior merger
proposal."92
Genesis' motive reveals the tension in how the law handles deal
protections. On the one hand, a bidder might not make a proposal unless
it can be guaranteed the deal will go through;93 on the other hand, a board
is required to get the best deal possible.94 This interplay appears to be at
the heart of how the Delaware courts treat deal protections and the
standard they use to review them. The Omnicare court applied the two-
prong test from Paramount,95 and when addressing the first prong noted
that the board needed to have "acted in good faith after conducting a
reasonable investigation"96 into a potential threat, which the board
85. See id. at 49.
86. See generally Quinn, Bulletproof, supra note 16, for a discussion on bulletproof
deals.
87. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
88. See id at 918.
89. See id
90. See id at 930-31.
91. Id. at 931 (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.), 651 A.2d
1361, 1388 (Del. 1995)).
92. Id. at 934.
93. See id; see also Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Standard, supra note 7, at 1012, and
accompanying text; supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
95. Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
96. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 ("The threat identified by the NCS board was the
possibility of losing the Genesis offer and being left with no comparable alternative
transaction.").
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satisfied. The next prong, the proportionality test, required that the board
act reasonably relative to the threat.97 The court then added a new
critical twist to the Unocal-Revlon test: courts are required to determine
whether deal protections are "preclusive or coercive before its focus
shifts to the range of reasonableness."9 8 This leads to a two-step process
in analyzing prong two: first determine whether the deal protections are
preclusive or coercive, and then determine whether it fits within the
range of reasonableness.9 9
The preclusive-coercive test comes from Unitrin, where a coercive
measure forced "a management-sponsored alternative to a hostile
offer"100 upon stockholders, and a preclusive measure would have either
"deprive[d] stockholders of the right to receive all tender offers or
preclude[d] a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting
proxy contests or otherwise."1ot The Omnicare court applied the
preclusive-coercive test to the facts of the case and determined that the
deal protections failed the first prong of the test because the deal
protections "made it 'mathematically impossible' and 'realistically
unattainable' for"1 02 anything other than the initial Genesis deal to
succeed regardless of the superiority of any subsequent bid.
3. Enhanced Scrutiny or Passivity?
In all of the foregoing cases, the courts engaged in a factual analysis
to determine whether the deal protections were valid. In examining such
fact-centered holdings, a question arises: have the courts been equally
consistent in dealing with matching rights in particular? In 2011,
Professor Brian Quinn, a professor at Boston College Law School, wrote
an article suggesting that the Delaware courts have been overly
permissive in dealing with matching rights.103 Professor Quinn argued
that courts accord great deference to a board's decision to grant matching
rights when compared to decisions regarding other deal protection
devices.10 4  Professor Quinn also argued that matching rights are
97. See id.
98. Id. at 932 (internal quotation marks removed, emphasis in original).
99. See id.
100. Id. at 935 (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.), 651 A.2d
1361, 1387 (Del. 1995); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154
(Del. 1989)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 936 (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388-89).
103. See generally Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Standard, supra note 7.
104. See id at 1014 ("[C]ourts should subject board decisions to grant matching
rights the same highly contextualized analysis that courts bring to bear when analyzing
other deal protection measures.").
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ubiquitous and their ubiquity is due in large part to that deference.'os
Further, and more importantly, he pointed out that "a board reading
recent court rulings might not be faulted if, in good faith, it misinterprets
the court's permissive approach to matching rights as admitting a per se
validity of such provisions."1 06
As an example of the type of factual analysis courts use to
determine the validity of other deal protections, one need only look to
how the chancellor in In re Dollar Thrifty Shareholder Litigationl07
treated a termination fee. The chancellor's analysis of the first prong of
the Unitrin preclusive-coercive test, the preclusiveness prong, was
detailed, analytical, and extensive.1os The chancellor's treatment of the
reasonableness prong was equally detailed and fact-intensive.109
The standard of review for deal protection measure challenges is
thus clearly defined, so where does Professor Quinn's charge come
from? To answer this question, it is worth looking at how the Delaware
Court of Chancery has handled the standard of review.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Emerging Trend: The Court of Chancery Opinions Coalesce
On its face it might appear that the Delaware Court of Chancery has
been overly permissive, as an analysis of challenges to matching rights
since Professor Quinn's article have shown that the court appears to hand
wave the challenges away.110 Not all is as it appears, however, for a
slightly deeper look reveals poor pleading as a potential source of the
problem."' Although plaintiffs may be pleading poorly in general, the
root cause of the poor pleading with respect to matching rights is the lack
of proper data and the difficulty in acquiring proper data on the economic
effects of matching rights and other deal protection measures."2 Without
adequate data, plaintiffs face two problems. First, plaintiffs cannot plead
with specificity the alleged preclusive effects of the mat6hing rights, and
second, the court cannot properly review or analyze the preclusiveness of
matching rights. Further economic research is necessary to provide
plaintiffs and the court (as well as boards who seek to make wise choices
105. See id. at 1019.
106. Id.
107. In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010).
108. See id at 613-14 (providing economic analysis, theoretical analysis, and a
detailed look at the facts of the specific controversy).
109. See id. at 614-15 (analyzing the deal negotiations that led to the fee, calculating
the economic impact of the fee, and discussing the board's motivations behind the fee).
110. See infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
111. See discussion infra Section III.A. 1 for more details on poor pleading.
112. See discussion infra Section III.A.2.
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and avoid costly litigation) with the economic data necessary to properly
analyze the effects of matching rights on deals.'13
1. Permissiveness or Poor Pleading Punishing Plaintiffs?
A casual look at Chancery decisions suggests that challenges to
matching rights are not properly evaluated by courts, but a deeper look
reveals that plaintiffs making challenges often fail to include enough
facts in their pleadings to enable challenges to move forward. In a 2011
case, the chancellor noted that "[p]laintiffs have not shown that any
alternative bidder was precluded by the challenged provisions"14 and
that "[t]he challenged provisions are relatively standard in form and have
not been shown. to be preclusive or coercive, whether they are considered
separately or collectively."'
Then, in late 2012, Novell, Inc. shareholders challenged a deal that
contained no-shop rovisions, matching rights, and a termination fee.1 6
The court first noted that the deal protection measures were "customary
and well within the range permitted under Delaware law."" 7  The
chancellor then asserted that "[t]he [p]laintiffs plead no facts suggesting
that the no-solicitation and matching rights provisions were
unreasonable.""8  In a 2014 case,'19 the court also pointed out
deficiencies in pleading by asserting that the plaintiff "[made] no effort
to explain how the devices at issue work in such a harmful manner."12 0
Without any such details in the pleading, the court relied upon precedent
and found that "there [wa]s ample precedent for the proposition that
the . .. matching rights . .. were reasonable."21 This pattern of plaintiffs
being unable to articulate sufficient facts repeated itself in In Re Triquint
Semiconductor, Inc.,122 where the chancellor noted that the plaintiff did
"not sufficiently articulate[] how [the] familiar and generally permissible
merger agreement provisions"23 were coercive or preclusive.
113. See discussion infra Sections III.A.2, III.B.
114. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, at
*79 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011).
115. Id.
116. See In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, at *11- 12 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 3, 2013).
117. Id. at *34.
118. Id. at *35.
119. See Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del. Ch. June 30,
2014).
120. Id. at *22.
121. Id.at*24.
122. In re Triquint, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 102 (Del. Ch. Jun. 13, 2014).
123. Id.at*11.
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Sometimes a chancellor will dismiss a matching right challenge
without any analysis at all. In a 2013 case, the chancellor stated that "the
only things stopping [a potential topping] bidder would be the matching
rights and the . .. termination fee" and then proceeded to discuss the
termination fee amount before concluding that the "deal protections
would not deter a serious suitor."124
The prior examples stand in stark contrast to how the courts have
analyzed other deal protection measures.125  This raises a potential
question: Is poor pleading really the problem or are matching rights so
ubiquitous that a new pleading standard has been born? Alternatively,
was the court overly permissive in the past, as Professor Quinn
suggested, and now precedent is so firmly in favor of finding no
preclusion for matching rights that the court cannot easily find them
preclusive? Courts have found that challenges to deal protection
measures are "garden-variety challenges"126 and that matching rights are
"unremarkable and customary,"1 2 7 "generally permissible,"12 8 "relatively
standard,"29 and "have not been shown to be preclusive."l30
This suggests that challenges to matching rights must overcome
several obstacles. On the preclusiveness side, plaintiffs must overcome
the obstacle that courts are loath to find matching rights preclusive
because of past precedent.131  On the reasonableness ide, they must
overcome the obstacle of their ubiquity.132 This seemingly impossible
set of hurdles grows ever harder with each challenge. Each time a
chancellor finds that a matching right provision is not preclusive, he13 3
124. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, *64-65 (Del.
Ch. May 21, 2013).
125. See, e.g., supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
126. In re BioClinica S'holder Litig., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25,
2013).
127. Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *23 (Del. Ch. June
30, 2014).
128. In re Triquint, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 102, at *9.
129. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, at
*79 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011).
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Given their ubiquity, it is hardly
surprising that chancellors are reticent to find matching rights unreasonable as that would
require a finding that virtually all corporate boards are unreasonable.
133. The male pronoun is used because, unfortunately, no woman served as
chancellor from 1994 until November 2015. See Maureen Milford, Historic advance for
women lawyers, NEWS J. (Oct. 1, 2015, 11:47 PM), http://delonline.us/lNwLfdy
(reporting that Tamika Montgomery-Reeves, if confirmed, would be the first woman on
the Court of Chancery since 1994); GLOBAL DEL., Tamika Montgomery-Reeves
confirmed to Delaware Court of Chancery, GLOBAL DEL. BLOG (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://l.usa.gov/lkViLmD (reporting that Ms. Montgomery-Reeves was confirmed to
serve as vice chancellor).
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naturally relies upon past precedent.134 By itself that does not properly
explain the seeming permissiveness, but when added to the emphasis on
pleading the problem begins to take shape.
There is one more piece to the puzzle. If a plaintiff claims that a
termination fee of, for example, 3.5 percent is preclusive, the chancellor
is capable of analyzing that number in the context of the deal and
applying enhanced scrutiny to it. 13 5 Put another way, a plaintiff might
not be challenging the existence of a termination fee but merely the
extent of the fee. Matching rights do not easily lend themselves to that
type of challenge,13 6 and further, they do not easily lend themselves to
that type of analysis.137
When applying the enhanced scrutiny test, the chancellor is to
determine only whether the board made a reasonable decision and not
whether the board made a perfect decision.138 If no past case has found
matching rights to be preclusive and they are ubiquitous in deals, it
would be hard for a chancellor, absent any other details, to find that they
are unreasonable.139
The Court of Chancery made this hesitancy to deem matching rights
unreasonable somewhat clear in In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder
Litigation.140 The court first pointed out that the plaintiffs had "made no
attempt to show" how the deal protection measures were preclusive or
would prevent "a genuine topping bidder willing to make a materially
higher bid."1 41 It then said that the court was "particularly reluctant" to
find a board's decision 'unreasonable in part because "courts are ill-
equipped to second guess [the decisions] as unreasonable."4 2  This
strongly suggests that because of the combination of poor pleading and
lack of empirical data the courts are unable to properly analyze
challenges to matching rights.
134. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
136. While termination rights come in ranges (mathematically there is a difference
between 2.0 percent and 2.5 percent), matching rights are either present or not.
137. For a detailed explanation of why that is, see Quinn, Re-evaluating the Standard,
supra note 7, at 1035-36.
138. C&J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps' & Sanitation Emps' Ret. Trust,
107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) ("a court applying Revlon's enhanced scrutiny must
decide 'whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision')
(emphasis in original) (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.), 651
A.2d 1361, 1385-86 (Del. 1995)).
139. It is true that a chancellor's mother might retort "If everyone jumped off a
bridge, would you?" when applying this type of reasoning, but the principle of stare
decisis trumps a mother's intuition.
140. In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012).
141. Id.at1048.
142. Id. at 1049.
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That brings the problem full circle. A plaintiff can plead that the
termination fee is excessive and a chancellor can easily analyze that. But
because the court does not have any other source to draw from for
analyzing matching rights, a plaintiff cannot simply plead that the
matching rights are preclusive and have the chancellor analyze it.143 This
is a critical problem and is one that Professor Quinn acknowledged.14 4
Professor Quinn's solution was that "[c]ourts should apply the same
highly-contextualized facts and circumstances analysis that is used when
reviewing ... other deal protection measures."1 45 This solution is not a
reasonable one, because it begs the question. The solution assumes that
courts are choosing to improperly analyze challenges to matching rights.
2. Lack of Scholarship Masquerades as Permissiveness
The problem is not that the Chancery Court is overly permissive or
fails to use contextualized facts, but that the chancellors lack an adequate
framework to analyze challenges to matching rights. As recently as 2000
there was only a single paper that attempted to provide an empirical
study of deal protection measures: a paper by Timothy Burch.146
Although that paper discussed only stock lockups,147 Burch's analysis
was extremely detailed, looking at over 2,000 deals from 1988 to 1995148
to conclude that while stock lockups "discourage competition for a
target"' 49 the lockups caused higher returns for shareholders when
compared to deals that did not have stock lockups. Slightly complicating
the issue, however, is that "deals with lockup options are much more
likely to be completed" which might lead to "biased returns for lockup
deals."so That finding is a testament to the fact that the researcher
engaged in such rigorous empirical analysis."' While the 2000 paper did
not look at matching rights or any other deal protection measures, it does
provide a useful example of rigorous empirical analysis.
Some additional research has been done since 2000 and "the
literature on this issue is thick and varies in its conclusions."1 52 As late
143. See Quinn, Re-evaluating the Standard, supra note 7, at 1035-36.
144. Id. at 1035-1038.
145. Id. at 1038.
146. See John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A
Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REv. 307, 311 (2000).
147. See Burch, supra note 28, at 104.
148. See id at 106.
149. Id. at 139.
150. Id. at 125.
151. The researcher not only looked at several thousand deals and returns on those
deals, but also engaged in robust regression analysis to control for different variables.
See id. at 127-3 1.
152. Davidoff& Sautter, supra note 1, at 682 n.1.
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as 2013, scholars noted that it is hard to "make definitive empirical
conclusions at this time" about the effects of combinations of deal
protection measures because of the difficulty in isolating and identifying
"individual lock-ups and their effect on bidding."1 s3 The difficulty with
analyzing the use of deal protection measures today when compared to
the study performed by Timothy Burch154 is the number and variety of
deal protection measures in use today, which significantly increases the
variables in any study."' It is difficult to "assess the wealth effects" of
the increasing use of deal protection measures without "more
econometric analysis."56
There are two potential solutions to the difficulty courts face when
addressing challenges to matching rights-plaintiffs can plead with more
specificity or scholars can produce better data for the court to use. This
Comment proposes that the latter solution is the more reasonable
solution. Simple logic, dictates that if there is no body of empirical data
that the court can use then it is unlikely plaintiffs can plead sufficient
data to overcome the precedential hurdles57 facing them. Further, one
court noted that the quick turnaround time for merger challenges can
"provide[] little opportunity for elegant pleading."158 If data are required
for better pleading it stands to reason that better scholarship is the proper
option as it would not only enable more elegant pleading, but it would
also greatly improve the court's ability to analyze the economic effects
(if any) that matching rights have on deals.
B. Challenge to Empiricists to Produce a Framework
Given the lack of empirical data (and the admitted difficulty in
producing the data)15 9 it is critical that empiricists step up to the
challenge by engaging in robust research and data generation. The
solution proposed in this Comment is for research to be done on the
economic realities of deal protection measures as they exist today.
Because of the increasing variety and prevalence in deal protection
measure use,160 it is critical that the courts have an adequate foundation
from which to analyze challenges to their use. Without adequate data,
153. Id. at 700.
154. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
155. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 1, at 700.
156. Id. at 700-01.
157. See discussion supra Section III.A.
158. In re BioClinica S'holder Litig., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb.
25, 2013).
159. See id.
160. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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courts will have no choice but to resort to precedent, which makes it
almost impossible for a challenge to matching rights to succeed. 161
A forthcoming article by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan
Subramanianl62 provides a great example of the type of analysis that this
Comment is calling for. Restrepo and Subramanian used "basic game
theory"163 to ascertain the deterrent effects of matching rights. The
authors also suggest that Delaware courts "apply basic game theory to
identify the deterrent effect of match rights."164 It stands to reason that if
courts are to engage in game theory analysis (or any other advanced
economic analysis) then researchers need to continue to provide
academic guidance to the judiciary. The paper notes that matching rights
"amplify other deal protection measures" while also providing analysis
that "provides greater precision on the magnitude of the deterrence
effect" 65 of matching rights.
The Restrepo and Subramanian article is a great step forward in
providing the type of information the courts need to correctly analyze
matching rights. It even suggests a framework: game theory.'66  A
single modem study is not enough, but it does highlight the importance
of research. It was the authors' use of game theory and empirical
analysis that enabled them to draw conclusions about the deterrent effect
of matching rights. Without such analysis, how are courts expected to
draw the same conclusions? Further research is needed, but the
forthcoming article by Restrepo and Subramanian is an excellent start.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Delaware Court of Chancery is in an unenviable position. It
must adhere to precedent while also analyzing deal protection measures
using enhanced scrutiny without simply deferring to a board's decision.
Without a proper empirical framework, a court will be unable to
adequately analyze the preclusiveness of a challenged measure. If a
plaintiff also lacks the ability to plead with specificity the court will
merely defer to precedent, as is expected, and challenges to matching
rights will invariably fail. That opens the court up to criticism, albeit
unfair, that they are being overly permissive and failing to use the proper
standard of review. Scholars can solve that problem by engaging in the
161. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
162. See Fernan Restrepo and Ghuan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal
Protection, 69 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssm.com/abstract-282043 1.
163. Id. (manuscript at 4).
164. Id.
165. Id. (manuscript at 37).
166. See id.
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empirical research necessary to enable the court to more fully analyze
challenges alleging that matching rights are preclusive.
